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Abstract
This paper reconsider the fundamental de Finetti’s representation theorem.
It is stressed its role at the front-line between Probability Theory and Infer-
ential Statistics and its relation to the fundamental problem of relating past
observations with future predictions i. e. the problem of induction.
1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to introduce and explain the conceptual role played by the
de Finetti’s representation theorem (henceforth dFRT) in the modern theory of sta-
tistical inference. dFRT had a strange destiny. Published first by Bruno de Finetti
(Innsbruck, 1906 - Roma, 1985) in an paper in French language, it was rediscovered
years later after translation into English (Barlow, 1992). It has been recognized as a
fundamental result for Bayesian Statistics and interpreted as a kind of justification
for the subjective interpretation of probability. For many reasons dFRT does not
find a place in undergraduate Statistics textbooks. First, undergraduate Statistics
textbooks follow mainly the frequentist approach with Bayesian methods relegated
(if lucky) in one final chapter close to the appendix. Second, dFRT involves some
mathematical technicalities that are not easily accessible to undergraduates. Third,
and perhaps most important, dFRT has a conceptual relevance rather than practical
one and this makes it usually more compelling for philosophers than for statisticians.
It has to be properly interpreted, i.e. to assign it a meaning that properly locates it
conceptually inside the theoretical framework of modern inferential statistics. The
usual interpretation of dFRT stressed its role both as a formal justification of the
“degrees of belief” school of Probability theory and as a link between the latter
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and the frequentist School (Poirier, 2010). Due to its borderline and foundational
role, dFRT has been approached with deference in some technical presentation. On
the other hand, the scope and power of this theorem is usually under-represented
in popular Statistics expositions or introductory textbooks. In what follows, I will
re-explore and clarify the meaning of the dFRT, stressing its pivotal role in par-
ticular in the induction process that was also the crux and motivation behind de
Finetti efforts concentrated in its theorem (Barlow, 1992). I hope this work can
serve as a source of inspiration for statisticians as well as philosophers of science
involved in foundation of probability and statistics courses. In class, dFRT can be
an opportunity to push the students to think “out of the box” with respect to the
traditional frequentist curriculum. The path followed here goes from some funda-
mental concept of Inferential Statistics to the very core of dFRT. It can be imagined
as a “smooth” entry point in preparation for more advanced techniques, especially
(but not limited to) for those interested in exploring the application of a subjective
probability approach in Inferential Statistics.
1.1 Coins, independence and prediction
In life there are no difficult things to understand, everything depends on the path
we follow on the way to reach the truth and clarify the terms used. For a full
understanding of dFRT its important to review some basics facts about probability
and inferential statistics [for the prerequisites the reader can refer to (Bernardo and
Smith, 2009; Bolstad, 2013; Cox, 2006)]. In what follows I will use the term induction
as a synonymous of being able to probabilistically infer about future outcomes looking
at the past relative frequencies. At the outset some important clarification are in
order. One difficulty of learning Statistics is that sometimes topics are presented in
a way that mathematical formalism “covers” the meaning of the concepts so that
the main point is not easy to be grasped by the novice. The good thing is that in
Statistics we can explain a lot of things with the use of a very common and simple
model: flipping a coin. At the outset I will focus on the coin-toss model, or more
in general on the Bernoulli random variable case, for two reasons. First because
historically this was the original setting considered by de Finetti and second because,
despite its simplicity, it contains all the ingredients to fully appreciate the impact
of this important mathematical result. The reader already used with these concepts
can jump directly to section 3. So let’s consider the canonical situation. We have
a coin and we don’t know if it is fair or not. We perform an experiment flipping
the coin n times. We want to infer the probability of the n+ 1 toss. We can model
the coin tossing process in the following way. First of all we introduce a random
variable defined as:
X(E) =
{
1 if E1 = {Head}
0 if E2 = {Tail} (1.1)
X is an example of a Bernoulli random variable characterize by the parameter θ =
p(E1). So we toss a coin n times and We the obtain a given list of zeros and ones.
We want to use this list to estimate the probability of getting Head the next toss:
p(1|1, 0, 1 . . . 0, 1, 1).
Despite its simplicity and ubiquity, the coin-tossing model has some important dis-
advantages and can lead students to some distorted ideas. The limitation is that
when we consider a (not necessarily fair) coin, we are adopting an underlying inde-
pendent and identically distributed assumption (IID henceforth) that is quite strong
but that makes life very easy for the inferential exercise as I will clearly show below.
But this does not represent the whole story. What if, for whatever reason, the toss-
ing are not independent? What if they are not identically distributed1? Will we be
able in these condition for example to predict the next toss given the past results?
p(xn+1|x1, . . . , xn) (1.2)
Is induction possible in this case? Here is where the dFRT shows all its power since
it clarify at least conceptually what we can and what we cannot do and know about
induction in the the dangerous lands outside the safe IID enclosure. An important
clarification has to be stated at the outset:
Remark 1. Independence alone in general is not enough for induction, since
p(xn+1|x1, . . . , xn) = p(xn+1) (1.3)
so this prevents the possibility to learn from the past. But if other than independent
our random variables are also identically distributed, the IID case, then we can learn
from the past using the relative frequency of the occurrence of the event of interest.
This fact is usually given for granted in a first year undergraduate statistics course.
As I will show below, the theoretical rationale behind this is another core result
springing from the dFRT.
1This is not an exotic possibility even in a simple coin tossing experiment. With some practice,
after many tosses, a person can become able to affect the outcome for example introducing a bias in
favor of head. The probability of getting head can thus change during the experiment, invalidating
the IID assumption.
2 inferential statistics: a bird’s eye view
The usual “statistical inference” tale follows some traditional steps: a) we are inter-
ested in a natural phenomenon that can be properly described by a given random
variable; b) it follows that the outcome of a possible experiment regarding the phe-
nomenon can be described by an appropriate statistical model; c) a parametric
statistical model M is defined in terms of the parametric family of densities that
depend on one or more parameters θi; d) we observe data {x1, . . . , xn} as a partic-
ular realization of the random sample {X1, . . . , Xn}; e) we use the sample to infer
the value of the parameter(s); f) we use the fully specified model for prediction of
future realization of the event of interest. The exact way in which this recipe is
put into practice depends on the paradigm adopted. We know that in life matters
rarely can be separated strictly in black and white, there is always a fuzzy shade of
gray. This is also true for this long standing debate about the disagreement between
frequentists versus Bayesians. By and large the main line of fracture lies in the way
each group interpret probability statements and how this is reflected in the approach
to statistical inference. Here a brief sketch of the two main schools of thought.
2.1 The frequentist approach
In this approach, probability is the long-run frequency of the occurrence of an event.
Parameters in the statistical models are considered fixed but unknown quantities. In
any statistical problem, we have data that are generally sampled from some popula-
tion or data generating process that is repeatable. Probability statements cannot be
made about parameters because they cannot meaningfully be considered as repeat-
able (Draper (2011)). The common condition used in undergraduate Statistics is
that observation are IID because when this property can be assumed the statis-
tical model of the joint distribution of (X1, . . . , Xn) can be simplified tremendously
by factorization:
p(x1, . . . , xn) =
∏
i
p(xi, θ). (2.1)
Notice that in the formula above I put a comma between the sample value xi and
the parameter θ because for the frequentist a parameter is indeed just a parameter:
a constant whose value is unknown. Any assumption about the term p(x1, . . . , xn)
appearing in (2.1), the joint distribution of (X1, . . . , Xn), is one of the fundamental
starting points of the inferential process and at the same time the entry point for a
full understanding of dFRT. Given this, frequentist estimation of θ is based on the
concept of likelihood function. Given a realization of {Xi}i=1...n , i.e. {xi}i=1...n,
the likelihood is the joint distribution regarded as a function of the parameter:
L(θ, x) =
∏
i
θxi(1− θ)n−xi = θ
∑
i xi(1− θ)n−
∑
i xi , θ ∈ [0, 1] (2.2)
The value of θ for which L(θ, x) reaches its maximum represents, for some well known
theroetical consideration, a very good estimation of the real θ (Wasserman, 2013,
chapter 9, p 122). This is what is known as themaximum likelihood estimation
(MLE). For the Bernoulli case, it can be easily proved that:
θˆMLE = argmax
θ
L(θ, x) =
∑
i xi
n
(2.3)
It’s worth stressing that for the frequentist θ is unknown but fixed, so letting the
parameter varying in a range is regarded as just a mathematical artifice. The esti-
mation of θ through MLE method leads to the relative frequency.
2.2 The Bayesian approach
For the Bayesian parameters are not just parameters in the above sense but random
variables, something that in the mind of the researcher can assume different values
with different probabilities attached to them. As any random variable, the parame-
ter θ is specified by a distribution or a density called prior pi(θ) that is based on the
state of knowledge that the subject interested in the random experiment possesses
about the parameters; it is here that the concept of degree of belief enters into the
picture: the prior is a (not necessarily subjective) idea about the possible values of
the parameter that can be different for different subject according to the different
knowledge that they possess about the data-generating mechanism of event of in-
terest. It is not important where the prior comes from, what is important for the
Bayesian framework is how we “update” our knowledge by combining the prior and
the information collected by a random experiment in the form of a set of data. This
is given formally by the famous Bayes formula:
p(θ|x1, . . . xn) = p(x1, . . . xn|θ)pi(θ)
p(x1, . . . xn)
=
p(x1, . . . xn|θ)pi(θ)∫ 1
0 p(x1, . . . xn|θ)pi(θ)dθ
. (2.4)
The denominator of the previous formula is the again the joint distribution of
(X1, . . . , Xn). Here p(x1, . . . xn) is called marginal distribution because it does not
depend on the parameter since it has been marginalized out by integration:
p(x1, . . . xn) =
∫ 1
0
p(x1, . . . xn|θ)pi(θ)dθ. (2.5)
This equality can be easily derived by assuming that
∫ 1
0 p(θ|x1, . . . xn) = 1, a fact
that makes sense only in the Bayesians framework where θ is treated as a random
variable. The term p(x1, . . . xn|θ) appearing on the right side of (2.4) is the likeli-
hood function. Formlly it looks like the same we discussed before in the frequentist
case but conceptually there are important differences. Furthermore, even Bayesians
adopt a concept of independence to simplify the joint distribution of (X1, . . . , Xn)
but now this assumes the following form of conditional independence:
p(x1, . . . , xn|θ) =
∏
i
p(xi|θ). (2.6)
In this case we have to put a bar | in the above formula to stress than we are con-
ditioning given the value of the random variable Θ = θ. There is a huge conceptual
gap between formula (2.6) and formula (2.1) reflecting the fracture that opposes
frequentist and Bayesian in the way they look at the inferential process.
Something at this point must be clear to the reader. Inference for the frequentist
means to find an approximate value of the (unknown) constant θ extracting infor-
mation from the collected sample at hand (x1, . . . , xn). Inference for the Bayesian
means to improve his initial knowledge about the distribution of the parameter. Both
will use their findings about θ to use the statistical model for prediction of future
events. This will be a recurrent theme if what follows. The issue of trying to predict
the future using the past information is a important point at stake for both frequen-
tists and Bayesian and it will be stressed again below since is a key ingredient in the
Figure 1: The Bayesian cycle for prediction.
elucidation of dFRT. Inferences about the parameter θ uses (2.4). What we need
is to specify the prior and this of course can be a subjective ingredient. For the
Bernoulli case, the Bayesian machinery uses the Beta distribution (Bolstad, 2013,
chapter 8, p 143):
pi(θ) = Beta(θ, a, b) =
Γ(a+ b)
Γ(a)Γ(b)
θa−1(1− θ)b−1, for 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 (2.7)
This prior, combined with the likelihood function, generate the posterior according
to Bayes rule (2.4). Different choice of the parameters a and b will generate different
classes of priors. In figure (2) the initial prior (horizontal line) is the uniform density
generated with the choice a = 1 and b = 1. The black curve refers to the density of
a the Beta(47,55), representing the posterior in the case of fair coin .
3 To the de Finetti’s representation theorem
The starting point to the dFRT is different and lies in the more general concept of
exchangeability instead of independence. Informally this means that given the set
of sampled observations {xi}i=1...n, the order of these observations does not matter.
This applies in the case of usual understanding of multiple tosses of a coin. In
the “coin tossing\number of heads” experiment modeled via the random variable
(1.1), the observed list of outcomes, for example {0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0}, are expected to be
exchangeable since the probability of this sequence does not change if we change the
Figure 2: From a uniform prior (horizontal line) and after 100 tosses of a fair coin
where #H ∼ #T . The resulting posterior is a Beta.
order of digits. What seems relevant here is not the order but the numbers of 1’s.
Exchangeability expresses a kind symmetry of beliefs about the random quantities in
which the future observation are expected to be similar to past observation (Stern,
2011; O’Neill, 2009; Bernardo, 1996; Freedman, 1995). The next, is a very important:
Remark 2. The condition of exchangeability is weaker than independence but it is
stronger than the identically distributed property. It can be easily proven that IID
random variables are exchangeable (Poirier (2010); Heath and Sudderth (1976)).
There are many situations in which this assumption is reasonable like in the coin toss-
ing experiment, and others where is not true or questionable. Consider the following
example. A football player who is practicing to score in a penalty: The sequence
scored penalties FAIL, FAIL, FAIL,GOAL,GOAL has presumably a higher prob-
ability than GOAL,GOAL,FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, because the player accuracy im-
proves with practice so we can expect the future will be different from the past. For
the mathematician taste, here I give a more formal definition of exchangeability:
Definition 3. A set of random variable {Xn} is said to be exchangeable if, given
the joint density p(x1, . . . , xn), we have
p(x1, . . . , xn) = p(xσ(1), . . . , xσ(n)) (3.1)
for all permutations σ of 1, ..., n.
If, like in the example of the IID coin toss, we are in presence of exchangeability,
this has important conceptual consequences in terms of predictive inference. Being
exchangeable means that the past is similar to the future and this symmetry can
be translated saying that knowing the past is telling us something about the future
and helps to predict the future. As already mentioned, this is strictly related to the
problem of predictive inference, that is to estimate:
p(xn+1|x1, . . . , xn) (3.2)
Equipped with the concept of an exchangeable sequence we can now state the dFRT
for Bernoulli distributed random variables. Various forms of extension and gener-
alization of exchangeability and de Finetti result can be found in literature. The
interested reader can refer to (De Finetti, 1937; Diaconis and Freedman, 1980; He-
witt and Savage, 1955).
Theorem 4 (De Finetti, 1930). let {Xi}∞i=1 be a sequence of finitely exchangeable
random variables i.e. ∀n > 0 each finite sub-sequence {Xi}ni=1 is exchangeable. Then
there exists a random variable Θ and a distribution function F (θ) such that:
p
(
lim
n→∞
∑
Xi
n
= Θ
)
= 1 with Θ ∼ F (θ) (3.3)
and
p(x1, . . . , xn) =
∫ 1
0
[∏
i
θxi(1− θ)1−xi
]
dF (θ) (3.4)
A detailed proof can be found in Chapter 4 of (Bernardo and Smith, 2009). Here
I will try to motivate the relevance of dFRT for the induction problem with some
examples and computer simulations. First let me clarify some points. As previously
mentioned, the main ingredient of inferential statistics is given by the hypothe-
ses over the structure joint probability distribution p(x1, . . . , xn). The dFRT tells
us that under exchangeability (not necessarily IID) the correct form of this joint
probability is given by (3.4). F (θ) in (3.3) is sometimes referred to as the mix-
ing distribution of the exchangeable random variable. dF (θ) can be thought of as
equivalent to pi(θ)dθ (in the sense of the Stieltjes integral) when F (θ) is continuous
(Spanos, 1999, chapter 10, p 524). This said, (3.4) becomes:
p(x1, . . . , xn) =
∫ 1
0
[∏
i
θxi(1− θ)1−xi
]
pi(θ)dθ (3.5)
where pi(θ) can be interpreted as the density function related to Θ.
Another important point of the theorem rests primarily on the existence result (3.3).
it assures the existence of a random variable that encapsulate the maximum possi-
ble knowledge about the underlying data-generating mechanism that produces data.
The (3.3) represents in fact the Law of Large Numbers for exchangeable random vari-
ables, a very important result embedded inside the dFRT. Under exchangeability
condition the relative frequency
∑
Xi/n tends to a random variable, not necessar-
ily “degenerate” (i.e. constant with probability one) as in the IID classical Large
Number Law case. A point usually stressed since the first de Finetti philosophical
interpretation is that dFRT justifies the use of a probability distribution over the
parameter Θ = p(X = 1). Summarizing, the condition of exchangeability implies:
 There exists a random variable Θ such that:
p(x1, . . . , xn|Θ = θ) = θk(1− θ)n−k;
 Θ is the limit of the relative frequencies: this is the the more general Law of
Large Numbers for exchangeable random variables and
F (θ) = lim
n→∞ p
(∑n
i=1Xi
n
≤ θ
)
 if F has density, dF (θ) = pi(θ)dθ where pi(θ) is the density of Θ. Before
observing the data, any hypothesis about pi(θ) (right or wrong that it can be)
corresponds to the prior: it is the idea about the underlying structure of the
parameter Θ before the data are collected;
Combining dFRT and Bayes rule, and after some calculus “gymnastic”, it is possible
to show that:
p(xn+1 = 1|x1, . . . , xn) =
∫ 1
0
θpi(Θ|x1, . . . , xn)dθ = E (pi(Θ|x1, . . . , xn)) . (3.6)
This means that, after the posterior is obtained, the best prediction about a future
observation is the expected value of the posterior (figure 3).
Figure 3: dFRT: the overall picture.
It should be clear now how much dFRT is important for the problem of induction.
Before observing the sample {x1, . . . , xn}, what we call prior is an idea about the
distribution of Θ that corresponds to an idea about its density pi(θ). This is strictly
related the the underlying data-generating mechanism that describe the structure of
the joint distribution p(x1, . . . , xn). The idea about pi(θ) can be more or less “close”
to the correct, real, distribution of θ, but after observing the data, something impor-
tant happens for the possibility of the induction process (i.e. making probabilistic
statements about the future using observation from the past):
Remark 5. Given the exchangeability hypotheses, and whatever is the observer’s
idea about the prior density pi(θ), the induction about the probability of the next
observation of the event of interest given the data, will be strongly guided by the
relative frequency of the observed event of interest.
In what follows I will motivate it with some examples where I will stress how the
theorem helps to solve the theoretical problem of induction.
3.1 Case I: {Xi}∞i=1 IID.
In this case, since {Xi}ni=1 are IID, by the law of large numbers we have that
∑
Xi
n
converges to a degenerate random variable Θ, that is a random variable for winch
there exist one value θ such that P (Θ = θ0) = 1 and such that E(Xi) = θ0. This
case is equivalent to say that (in what follows we assume k =
∑
i xi):
p(X1 = x1, . . . , Xn = xn) = θ
k
0(1− θ0)n−k (3.7)
This is a quit special situation. In general things are more complicated as I will
mention below. In this case Θ does not have a density but, according to the discus-
sion above, we can still manage the integral (3.4) “as if” it’s density is represented
by a Dirac delta function (for a “refresh” of its properties, see appendix A):
pi(θ) = δ(θ − θ0) (3.8)
and the corresponding step distribution:
F (x) =
∫ x
−∞
δ(θ − θ0)dθ. (3.9)
Figure 4: Distribution of
∑n
i Xi/n in the case p(
∑
Xi = k) =
(
n
x
)
(0.5)n(0.5)n−k
for different values of n. From the left to the right n = 5, 20, 100. It clearly shows
that the limit distribution corresponds to the degenerate case Θ = θ0 with, in this
example, θ0 = 0.5.
In this case we have:
∫ 1
0
{
θk(1− θ)n−k
}
δ(θ − θ0)dθ = θk0(1− θ0)n−k, (3.10)
where the natural choice for approximating θ0 is
θˆ0 =
k
n
. (3.11)
This is the case where frequentist and Bayesian meet.
3.2 Case II: {Xi}∞i=1 exchangeable but not independent.
A very instructive example due to Bayes (Schervish, 2012, p.29). Let’s imagine that
we have a sequence of Bernoulli random variable (X1, X2, . . . ) such that
p
(
n∑
i
Xi = k
)
=
1
n+ 1
, for k = 1 . . . n. (3.12)
In this case {Xi}∞i=1 are exchangeable, they are also identically distributed since
p(Xi = 1) =
∫ 1
0 θdF but they are not independent since for example p(X2|X1) 6=
p(X2). dFRT applies, so we can specify the joint probability using (3.4). Since
{Xi}∞i=1 are not IID the dFRT tells us that
∑n
i Xi/n still converges to a random
variable whose “structure” is now more complicated than the degenerate case saw in
the classical IID example above. It can be easily shown analytically that F (θ) = θ.
Figure 5: Distribution of
∑n
i Xi/n in the case p(
∑
Xi = k) =
1
n+1 for different
values of n. From the left to the right n = 5, 20, 100. It clearly shows that the limit
distribution is equal to θ.
This is equivalent to say that the prior pi(θ) = 1, i.e θ has a uniform distribution
in (0, 1). Here I will motivate this intuitively with the help of some computer sim-
ulations. Figure (5) shows the distribution function of
∑n
i Xi/n for our random
variables at different values of n. It clearly shows what happens if nbecomes large.
From picture 3.2 we observe (and it can be easily proved) that the expected value
of the posterior tends to 0.5. This implies that, if the underlying data generating
mechanism is characterized by a Θ distributed as F (θ) = θ, we expect to observe
around 50% of 0′s and 50% of 1′s. This is reasonable since the number of ways an
almost 50/50 case can happen under this condition is overwhelmingly big compared
to other arrangements as n grows. As stressed before, relative frequencies will lead
to a correct prediction.
3.3 The general case.
In general the possible structure of p(Sn = k) for the binary case is limited because
of the constrains of the probability properties. The previous cases are only particular
situations and in general it is possible to show that the formula for the general form
of p(Sn = k) is given by:
p(Sn = k) =
(
n
k
)∫ 1
0
θk(1− θ)n−kΓ
(
b
c
)
Γ
(
r
c
)
Γ
(
b
c +
r
c
) dθ, (3.13)
where Γ stands for the Gamma function, n is the number of successes over the total n
and and a, b, r, care suitable parameters (Helfand (2013)). The (3.13) is called Po´lya
urn model (for more details the reader can refer to (Johnson and Kotz, 1977)). It
follows that:
lim
n→∞
∑
Xi
n
= Θ ∼
∫ θ
0
1
Beta
(
b
c ,
r
c
)u bc−1(1− u) rc−1du (3.14)
3.4 An “extreme” case
Let’s now consider the situation depicted in figure (6). Given Xi ∼Bernoulli(θ),
such that p(Xi = 1) = θ and:
p(Xn+1 = 1|Xn = 1) = 1 and p(Xn+1 = 0|Xn = 0) = 1 (3.15)
{Xi}∞i=1 are exchangeable and satisfy the dFRT conditions, the relative frequency
can direct successfully the induction process.
4 What if {Xi}∞i=1 are not exchangeable?
Let’s try to summarize the story so far. dFRT is an important theoretical tool since
it can shed light on the meaning and role of the prior in the whole Bayesian cycle. It
shows how the IID case represents just one among many different possibilities about
the distribution over the parameter of interest θ. It is important to stress that if we
are interested in a predictive exercise:
p(xn+1|x1, . . . xn), (4.1)
even if the initial hypotheses about the joint distribution differ, after the data have
been collected, opinionns tend to “’converge”. This is clearly shown in the following
example.
Before the data Xi are collected, we have:
Figure 6: An “extreme” case of exchangeable RV.
 IID assumption: p(1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0) = 1
25
= 11024
 Uniform prior assumption: p(1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0) = 12772 .
Given the observed set of data 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, prediction about the next ob-
servation will be:
 IID assumption: p(1|1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0) = 12
 after updating the uniform: p(1|1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0) = 12
This is a well known fact in Statistical practice: irrespective of the idea about the
prior, different posterior will tend to be close to each other after data are collected
(figure 8). In particular the expected value of the posterior will be close to the
relative frequency and so it will be the prediction about the probability of the next
observation of an event. So the relative frequency plays an important role but
this is true if we are in presence of exchangeable random variables. If they lack
this property, relative frequency in general is no longer able to lead the induction
process. I will show this with the following example.
Given Xi ∼Bernoulli(θ), such that
p(Xn+1 = 1|Xn = 0) = 1 and p(Xn+1 = 0|Xn = 1) = 1 (4.2)
The evolution with non zero probability are depicted in (7). Xi are not exchangeable
and induction fails since the relative frequency now is not a guide to the estima-
tion of the underlying mechanism that produced the data. Indeed for example
p(1|1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0) = 1 and not the value suggested using the relative fre-
quency that is 0.5 in this case.
Summarizing: if a sequence of random variable is exchangeable, the relative frequency
of data leads to a proper evaluation of the predictive probability. If the random
variables are not exchangeable, in general the relative frequency will not guide to a
proper inferential conclusion. This is the case where the Bayes inferential machinery
(2.4) goes haywire. This can be synthesize in the following final:
Figure 7: A case of not exchangeable random variables. Induction will fail in this
case.
Figure 8: Different opinions about θ will converge, with the expected value close to
the relative frequency.
Remark 6. If Xi are not exchangeable, the relative frequency is in general no longer
able to direct the induction process to a proper conclusions.
5 The moral of the story
Frequentist and Bayesian inference are usually pictured as irreconcilable paradigms
in Statistics and the main difference between the two (parameters fixed versus pa-
rameters as random variables) often stressed as a the fracture between the two
visions. The de Finetti’s representation theorem is usually introduced in the con-
text of Bayesian inference and it is considered to play a role in the “justification” of
the prior distribution of the parameter of interest. In this expository work I tried
to challenge this view with an understanding of the theorem that stresses its role at
the front line between probability theory and inferential statistics, and its relation
to the problem of relating past observations with future predictions. To conclude, a
list of the main key-points:
 exchangeability is the key property for induction;
 the use of relative frequencies for prediction during the induction process makes
sense only in the presence of exchangeability;
 de Finetti’s theorem clarify the role played by the relative frequency in the
Bayesian framework;
 the IID case is a particular case;
 for non-exchangeable random variables, relative frequencies will fail to guide
the induction process;
 the theorem can be extended to arbitrary real-valued exchangeable sequences
(De Finetti, 1937). Finite version and generalizations can be found in (Diaconis
and Freedman, 1980). Further generalizations in (Hewitt and Savage, 1955).
“This [theorem] is one of the most beautiful and important results in
modern statistics. Beautiful, because it is so general and yet so sim-
ple(Lindley and Phillips, 1976)”
Appendix A Dirac delta
It is obvious that probability density is definite only for absolute continuous vari-
ables. However, in some “pathological” situation can be useful to extend the concept
of density. The figure 4 below depicts the posterior shapes (described by Betas dis-
tribution) for different valises of n. The when N increases the base of the bell-shaped
density will be narrower and narrower and the top higher and higher. For N very
big we can imagine that the density will tend to something with an infinitesimally
narrow base whereas the height goes to infinity. The limit density when N →∞ is
not a “traditional” density but an exotic mathematical object called a Dirac delta
generalized distribution. The Dirac delta, also called generalized function, is usually
indicated as δ(θ − θ0) and formally it can be described as follows:
δ(θ − θ0) =
{
0 θ 6= θ0
∞ θ = θ0 (A.1)
with the property that
∫
R
δ(x)dx = 1 (A.2)
The delta function is not a distribution, technically it is not even a mathematical
function. Instead it can make sense to use it inside integrals in operation involving
limits of sequences of normalized (integral= 1) functions behaving like the Beta in
(A). If we have a sequence of such functions δn(x) it holds that:
lim
n→∞
∫ ∞
−∞
f(x)δn(x− x0)dx = f(x0) (A.3)
Figure 9: The limit density of p(θ) will be a δ function
It should be emphasize that the integral on the left-hand side of is not a Riemann
integral but a limit. It can be treated as a Stieltjes integral if desired. δ(x)dx is
replaced by dH(x), where dH(x) is the Heaviside step function.
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